Afghanistan-Who is in Charge? The Horse or the driver?

Entirely too much has been made of whether or not we accede to General McCrystals' request for more troops. For the second time this week I make a silly Horse analogy. Not the horse, but the analogy.

I was always taught to, first, define the problem, then develop a solution and finally formulate a plan to implement the solution. Decide where you need to go (the driver wants a cheeseburger), decide how best to get there (by cart - it's too far to walk) and finally get moving, to your destination. In this silly story, the horse directed by the driver over the most appropriate path, direct, avoiding dangerous neighborhoods and, perhaps via scenic park drive. This is as a simple process. Deciding what it takes to get the job done before clearly defining the job makes no sense at all.

So, why does it matter what General McCrystal has requested? At least not until we understand clearly where we want to go and how we plan to get there. At this point, General McCrystals input is essential and should be seriously considered.

I have yet to hear a clearly defined reason of what we want to accomplish in Afghanistan except the mushy mealy phrase "defeat Al Quaida". Well, that may, or may not according to some, be a worthy goal. But, if it is a worthy goal, then it requires a worthy definition. Confine them to an area, arrest them all, kill them all, disillusion their followers? What are we trying to accomplish here. Defeat is an awfully big word.

Once we define our mission, which will always be in a state of flux, we need a strategy for implementing our goal. General, McCrystal, and the rest of the military heads can give us some serious input here.

With a clearly defined both goal and how we intend to get there it is time to turn it over to the military. Bearing in mind that we control the reins and need to keep our eyes on the path and make the necessary course changes if the horse wanders or unexpected traffic blocks the path.

This all seems ridiculously simple. If we let the horse decide where to go we will invariably end up eating oats.

Maybe Now is a Good Time to Talk About Afghanistan

AboutWe are supporting a corrupt government who does not have popular support and may only be winning the current election because of election fraud. Our soldiers are dying while their soldiers are steering clear of the dangerous action. We are spending a lot of money. Their politicians are getting rich off of corruption. Their culture is as alien to us as our is to them. We have no clear definition of what our goals are and how will define victory. Our military leaders are asking for more troops and more money.

Does this ring a familiar bell? It does to me. Sounds a lot like it to me. Before we get further involved, I think it is time for some sort of dialogue to, at a minimum, define what we want to accomplish, how we will measure our progress and what we will do if we start to fall short of our goals.

Goerge Will, in todays Washington Post, is recommending we withdraw,

U.S. forces are being increased by 21,000, to 68,000, bringing the coalition total to 110,000. About 9,000 are from Britain, where support for the war is waning. Counterinsurgency theory concerning the time and the ratio of forces required to protect the population indicates that, nationwide, Afghanistan would need hundreds of thousands of coalition troops, perhaps for a decade or more. That is inconceivable.

I am not yet advocating withdrawal. But, it is time for our leaders explain clearly why we should be in Afghanistan, what we want to accomplish, how we will measure our success and how much it will cost in lives and money. Public support is already waning and will only get worse. We can not win a 10 year war without strong public support. And, if we can't win, why start? Or, at least, narrow our focus.

Afghanistan Commentary

I’ve long argued that there should be a test for any officer who wants to serve in Iraq or Afghanistan — just one question: “Do you think the shortest distance between two points is a straight line?” If you answer “yes,” you can go to Germany, South Korea or Japan, but not to Iraq or Afghanistan. Well, this war has produced a class of officers who are very out-of-the-box thinkers. They learned everything the hard way — not in classes at Annapolis or West Point, but on the streets of Fallujah and Kandahar. From the Commentary below

The Class Too Dumb To Quit

By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

Published: July 21, 2009

Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan

I’m here in Helmand Province in southern Afghanistan. This is the most dangerous part of the country. It’s where mafia and mullah meet. This is where the Taliban harvest the poppies that get turned into heroin that funds their insurgency. That’s why when President Obama announced the more than doubling of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, this is where the Marines landed to take the fight to the Taliban. It is 115 degrees in the sun, and Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff, is addressing soldiers in a makeshift theater.

“Let me see a show of hands,” says Admiral Mullen, “how many of you are on your first deployment?” A couple dozen hands go up. “Second deployment?” More hands go up. “Third deployment?” Still lots of hands are raised. “Fourth deployment?” A good dozen hands go up. “Fifth deployment?” Still hands go up. “Sixth deployment?” One hand goes up. Admiral Mullen asks the soldier to step forward to shake his hand.

This scene is a reason for worry, for optimism and for questioning everything we are doing in Afghanistan. It is worrying because between the surges in Iraq and Afghanistan, we are grinding down our military. I don’t know how these people and their families put up with it. Never have so many asked so much of so few.

The reason for optimism? All those deployments have left us with a deep cadre of officers with experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, now running both wars — from generals to captains. They know every mistake that has been made, been told every lie, saw their own soldiers killed by stupidity, figured out solutions and built relationships with insurgents, sheikhs and imams on the ground that have given the best of them a granular understanding of the “real” Middle East that would rival any Middle East studies professor.

Read the rest of this commentary here